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Abstract 
 Acceptance of windfarm siting has been proven to be difficult. It is important to look at 
ways to increase this acceptance since renewable energy sources are needed to create a 
more sustainable energy consumption. In this study three different compensations for a 
windfarm siting have been compared to each other using scenarios. Acceptance of the 
project (i.e. windfarm) and acceptance of the compensation were measured for monetary 
compensation and co-ownership compensation. Two forms of co-ownership were 
investigated: symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership. Both forms of co-
ownership included a manipulation which made participants feel a sense of co-ownership. 
Voice co-ownership also included a right of say. This study also aimed to look at 
underlying psychological processes that could explain the difference in acceptance 
between compensations. Perceived morality of the compensation was expected to 
mediate the difference on acceptance between monetary compensation and co-ownership 
compensation, since money as a compensation can be viewed as immoral. Analysis of 
variance showed no difference on acceptance between the three conditions for either the 
compensation or the project. Mediational analysis showed that perceived morality does 
have a relationship with acceptance. It is important that a compensation is perceived as 
moral. Limitations, suggestions for future research, theoretical and practical implications 
are discussed.   
 
Keywords: monetary compensation, co-ownership compensation, windfarm, acceptance 
of compensation, acceptance of project 
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The effect of monetary reward or co-ownership on perceived morality and 
acceptance of windfarm siting 
  In 2020, the European Union hopes to reach the goal of harvesting 20% of all 
energy from renewable energy sources (“2020 Climate & energy package”, 2016). 
Examples of renewable energy sources are wind farms, solar panels or hydroelectrical 
facilities. However, acceptance of these sustainable energy facilities by local community 
people has been proven to be difficult (Ter Mors, Terwel & Daamen, 2012). The host 
community where the facility would be placed often resists to accept it. One recent 
example of such resistance happened in The Hague, Netherlands (“Tegenstander van 
windmolen”, 2017). The government had decided to place a windmill next to one of the 
main highways (“Enorme windmolen bij”, 2016). However, the local community was not 
informed about the placement and showed much opposition. They even started a petition 
against the wind mill (“Tegenstander van windmolen”, 2017). It is known that people in 
general tend to give much higher support for wind energy facilities on a national level 
than on a regional one (Bell, Gray, Haggett, & Swaffield, 2013 as described in Walker, 
Russel, & Kurz, 2017). When there is talk of a local wind farm placement then local 
people tend to show higher levels of opposition than people on a national level (Jones, & 
Eiser, 2010). Costs, risks and benefits are seen as unbalanced by people in the community 
(Kunreuther, Fitzgerald, & Aarts, 1993). They perceive benefits to be on a national or 
regional level (Ter Mors et al., 2012). The costs are perceived to be solely local, among 
which shade flickering and noise are seen as the most important negative side-effects of 
the wind farm (Environmental impacts of wind power, 2013, 3).  
  Compensation has been offered in order to increase acceptance of windfarms (Ter 
Mors et al., 2012). Compensations can have different forms, such as monetary rewards 
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(Kunreuther et al., 1990), community benefits (Walker et al., 2017) or shared ownership 
(Reilly, O’Hagan, & Dalton, 2016; Warren & McFadyen, 2010). Monetary rewards often 
contain a collective or individual sum of money in reward for accepting the new facility 
(Claro, 2007). Community benefits are rewards given to a community upon accepting the 
new facility (Walker et al., 2017). These rewards are distributed by the local government 
in a way which is beneficial to the whole community, for example by building a new 
playground or community swimming pool. Shared ownership gives local community 
people some form of ownership of the new facility (Warren & McFadyen, 2010). 
   The effect of monetary reward as compensation has been researched and it has 
been shown that money does not by definition increase the acceptance of a new 
(potentially hazardous) facility by local community people (Carnes et al., 1982; Ferreira, 
& Gallagher, 2010; Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, & Eichenberger, 1996; Jenkins-Smith & 
Kunreuther, 2001; Kunreuther, Easterling,  Desvousges, & Slovic, 1990; Mansfield, Van 
Houtven, & Huber, 2002; Ter Mors et al., 2012). One study suggests that monetary 
compensation does lead to acceptance of windfarms (Groothuis et al., 2008). However, 
people whom perceived green energy as important required less compensation. Another 
study showed that public goods are preferred over monetary rewards when a public harm 
is perceived (Mansfield, Van Houtven, & Huber, 2002). Since it is unclear whether 
monetary compensation increases acceptance, it is important to look at other types of 
compensation which might more certainly lead to increased acceptance.  
  One other type of compensation, which is non-monetary, is community co-
ownership (Chi & Han, 2008). Co-ownership is a shared ownership between the local 
community and the owner of the energy facility (Kalkbrenner & Roosen, 2016). There 
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often is some form of shared revenue which is distributed by the owner of the energy 
facility to the local people. Sometimes the community can also have decisional power to 
make decisions about the facility (Zoellner, Schweizer-Ries, & Wemheuer, 2008). Co-
ownership compensation has been researched in several case studies in Germany 
(Kalkbrenner & Roosen, 2016; Zoellner, Schweizer-Ries, & Wemheuer, 2008), the 
Netherlands (Van Der Schoor & Scholtens, 2015), Scotland (Allan, Mcgregor, & Swales, 
2011; Slee, 2015) and the United Kingdom (Goedkoop & Devine-Wright, 2016; Walker, 
Devine-Wright, Hunter, High & Evans, 2010). It is suggested that co-ownership leads to 
more acceptance of renewable energy sites than monetary compensation (Goedkoop & 
Devine-Wright, 2016). There is a great general support for co-ownership, but it has been 
proven to be difficult to make co-ownership work in practice (Devine-Wright, 2016).   
Companies often choose to use monetary compensation instead of co-ownership 
compensation because co-ownership gives local community members a right of say (i.e. 
voice). This complicates the decision-making process since the company would have to 
listen to the wishes and demands of the local community members. Issues with trust 
between the two parties complicate the decision process even further (Goedkoop & 
Devine-Wright, 2016). Therefore, it is important to find a compensation that increases 
acceptance and does not complicate the decision making process of renewable energy 
companies. The aim of this research is to investigate the level of acceptance of windfarm 
siting when using different types of compensation and to investigate underlying 
psychological constructs that explain the process.   
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Monetary compensation and co-ownership compensation  
  A study towards co-ownership compensation in a windfarm siting found that co-
ownership makes locals accept the energy facility more (Musall & Kuik, 2011). It also 
gives them a more positive attitude towards renewable energy in general. Other studies 
also found the positive effect of co-ownership on acceptance (Warren & McFadyen, 
2010; Loring, 2007; Toke, 2005). A study by Warren and McFadyen (2010) compared a 
community-owned windfarm with developer-owned windfarms in Scotland. They 
discovered that the community which owned a windfarm was more positive towards wind 
energy than a community which did not own a windfarm. Results even showed that 
future community-owned windfarms would increase this positive effect even more 
(Warren & McFadyen, 2010).  
  Co-ownership as used in most cases exists out of two parts: participation and 
voice (Goedkoop & Devine-Wright, 2016). Participation can be viewed as the activities 
that the local community members engage in when receiving co-ownership of the project 
(Chi & Han, 2008). These activities often include attending meetings about the project in 
the earlier stages or even when the facility has already been build. Voice is the right of 
say that local community members receive when having co-ownership (Goedkoop & 
Devine-Wright, 2016). It allows them to influence the process by making decisions. If co-
ownership includes both participation and a right of say then this can be considered as 
voice co-ownership. When co-ownership solely includes participation then this can be 
considered as symbolic co-ownership. 
  One explanation for why co-ownership compensation might work better than 
monetary compensation can be found in an article by Kalkbrenner and Roosen (2016). 
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People in the community in general rather participate than invest money in renewable 
energy projects (Kalkbrenner & Roosen, 2016). It has been shown that participation leads 
to acceptance in general (Erez, Early, & Hulin, 1985). When a person participated in goal 
setting then their acceptance of the goal setting would increase. The increased acceptance 
then led to increased performance (Erez, Early, & Hulin, 1985). Van Der Schoor and 
Scholtens (2015) also showed that engaging in activities increases the acceptance of the 
renewable energy facility. Continuing the involvement in activities would be very 
beneficial on the long term (Van Der Schoor & Scholtens, 2015). But especially 
participation in the early stages of the project development is known to increase 
acceptance (Chi & Han, 2008).  
  Previous research has looked primarily at the effectiveness of voice in 
combination with participation and not at the effect of exclusively participation 
(Goedkoop & Devine-Wright, 2016; Kalkbrenner & Roosen, 2016; Terwel, Harink, 
Ellemers, & Daamen, 2010). A few studies suggest that participation, or symbolic co-
ownership, alone can indeed increase acceptance of wind farms (Maruyama, Nishikido, 
& Iida, 2007; Warren & McFadyen, 2010). When people were given the possibility to 
inscribe their own names in a wind turbine they noticed that this procedure gave people a 
sense of ownership (Maruyama, Nishikido, & Iida, 2007). This sense of ownership was 
important for the acceptance of the windfarm siting. Another study also implied that 
symbolic co-ownership can already increase acceptance (Warren & McFadyen, 2010). 
Names were given to wind turbines which were owned by a community. These names 
increased the acceptance of the wind turbines in this community.  
  Since symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership both make the local 
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community members participate in the project and monetary compensation does not, it is 
expected that both forms of co-ownership compensation lead to higher acceptance than 
monetary compensation. Acceptance can be understood as acceptance of the project (for 
example the windfarm) and acceptance of the compensation (for example a sum of 
money). Acceptance of the compensation will ultimately lead to the realization of the 
proposed renewable energy facility. Acceptance of the project will ultimately lead to a 
more positive view of the renewable energy facility.  
Hypothesis 1: Both symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership as compensation lead 
to higher acceptance of the project and the compensation than monetary compensation.   
 
Voice co-ownership and symbolic co-ownership  
  The greatest difference between symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership 
is the inclusion of decisional power in voice co-ownership. It has been shown that giving 
people a voice in the matter (i.e. decisional power) increases acceptance (Terwel, 
Harinck, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2010). This increased acceptance is caused by a higher 
perceived procedural justice and more involvement by the local community members 
(Loring, 2007; Erez, Early & Hulin, 1985). Another study also shows that increased 
involvement leads to a more successful project (Wolsink, 2007). It was found that 
procedural justice is one of the key-factors to successfully implement a new wind energy 
facility. When local community people experience more procedural justice then they are 
more likely to accept the facility. This procedural justice is thought to increase with local 
involvement (Wolsink, 2007).  
  In summary, when community members have a right of say then they feel more 
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engaged in the project and have an actual possibility to influence the process. With 
symbolic co-ownership community members have no right of say and therefore no power 
to influence the project. Since voice leads to increased acceptance due to a higher 
perceived procedural justice, it is expected that voice co-ownership leads to higher 
acceptance of the compensation and the project than symbolic co-ownership.  
Hypothesis 2: Voice co-ownership leads to higher acceptance of the project and the 
compensation than symbolic co-ownership.  
  In order to understand why monetary compensation is often refused and co-
ownership seems to receive a lot of initial support we will have to look at underlying 
psychological constructs. One of these constructs influencing acceptance could be 
morality. 
 
Morality  
  Local community people often feel as if they are being bribed when monetary 
compensation is used (Walker et al, 2010). This bribery effect leads to lower acceptance 
of the renewable energy facility (Walker et al, 2017). One reason that monetary 
compensation is viewed as bribery, might be that obtaining money in return for 
acceptance is seen as immoral. Stellar and Willer (2014) showed that immorally obtained 
money was viewed as less desirable and less valuable. The money would be viewed as a 
contaminated object, which would lower the moral self-concept when accepted. So, 
community members rejected the money because accepting it would have harmed their 
moral self-worth. Co-ownership might well forgo this procedure because it does not seem 
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to have this bribery effect (Walker et al, 2017). It is not known that co-ownership lowers 
the self-concept upon accepting.  
Hypothesis 3: The effect of the type of compensation as predicted in the first hypothesis 
is mediated by the perceived morality of the compensation.  
 
Present research 
  For all three compensation measures (monetary compensation, symbolic co-
ownership compensation and voice co-ownership compensation) a scenario was 
developed which described a fictional scenario of a wind farm siting in a community. 
Participants read a short introduction of the problem with an explanation about the 
compensation they could receive in return for their acceptance of the wind farm. A 
questionnaire followed about acceptance of the proposal, acceptance of the compensation 
and about how moral they perceived the compensation to be.   
 
Method 
Participants and design 
  Within two weeks, as many participants as possible were recruited by canvassing 
in different cities of the Netherlands. Participants had to be 18 years or older to 
participate because people in the Netherlands are lawfully allowed to vote for 
governmental or community issues from 18 years old. In a real life scenario it is very 
likely that only adults are allowed to vote for or against the siting of a renewable energy 
facility. Every IP address was allowed to participate only once in order to ascertain that 
all answers are uncorrelated. Participants whom selected the wrong answer in the 
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comprehension check were to be excluded from further analysis. Participants whom did 
not finish the entire questionnaire were to be excluded as well. A total of 241 participants 
participated in the questionnaire of which 107 were men, 87 were women and one 
indicated to be other (46 missing). Participants were aged between 18 and 79 years old 
(M = 43.88 years, SD = 16.86, 49 missing). Most of the participants were residents of 
Leiden, Den Haag or Sassenheim, which are cities in the Netherlands. The average 
educational level of participants ranged from having completed elementary school and 
having obtained a University degree.  
  We tested our hypotheses by randomly assigning participants in a field 
experiment with a one (acceptance) by three between-subjects design (monetary vs. voice 
co-ownership vs. symbolic co-ownership). The effect of the type of compensation, the 
independent variable, was tested on the level of acceptance, the dependent variable. The 
level of acceptance was measured for acceptance of the project and acceptance of the 
compensation. Morality was tested as the mediator variable. 
 
Procedure  
  Before obtaining any data, this study was approved by the Ethical Committee of 
Psychology of Leiden University as well as by the VCOB of Leiden University. 
Participants were asked to participate in the study by canvassing. The canvassing took 
place in different cities and villages of the Netherlands, for example: Leiden, The Hague, 
Sassenheim and Voorschoten. People were asked at their door or on (bus-)stations 
whether they were interested to participate in the study. Upon agreeing they received a 
flyer which contained all the information about the study and a link to the online 
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questionnaire. When opening the online questionnaire, participants would first read and 
sign the informed consent form. Which included the information that if the participant 
wished to stop the questionnaire then they could close the screen at any time and their 
data would not be analysed.  
  Next, the participants were randomly divided into one of the three compensation 
conditions. Participants in all conditions first read an explanation of the situation, which 
stated the following: “Thank you for participating in this research! In a moment you will 
read a description of a fictional situation that could take place at this moment somewhere 
in the Netherlands. Please read the text carefully and imagine that this situation is real. 
Afterwards we will ask you some questions about what you think of this situation. Please 
answer all the questions.” Next, participants were given a scenario sketch. The sketches 
were constructed by ourselves. Each scenario sketch started with the following: “Imagine 
that you live in the fictional village ‘Groest’ with approximately 5000 residents. There 
are plans to build a windfarm in the neighbourhood Groest near your house. The 
neighbourhood Groest is extremely qualified for the placing of the windfarm, among 
others because of the strong and continuous wind power in this area. The windfarm will 
consist of six windmills, scattered over an area of 72 hectare (similar to 108 soccer 
fields). The windmills will last approximately 15 years and on an average day they 
deliver enough energy together for 12000 households.” Next, all participants read a 
paragraph containing information about the pros and cons of the windfarm: “Specialist, 
among which scientist, engineers and environmental authorities, have made an 
estimation of the expected local nuisance of the windfarm. From this it is proposed that 
the windfarm will be visible from your house and shall produce a volume which is 
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noticeable when you are outside. The maximum sound intensity near your house is 45 
decibel, which is comparable to the noise of an average refrigerator.”  
  After this paragraph a compensation offer was made to each participant, differing 
per condition. In the monetary condition the compensation offer read the following: 
“With the arrival of energyprojects such as the windfarm in Groest it is common to offer 
the surrounding residents a compensation. If the residents of Groest agree to the 
construction of the windfarm, then a compensation per household will be made available. 
Each surrounding household, under which your household, receives in that case a sum of 
120 euro per household per year for the next 15 years. After 15 years you will have 
received 1800 euro.” In the symbolic co-ownership condition the compensation states: 
“With the arrival of energyprojects such as the windfarm in Groest it is common to offer 
the surrounding residents a compensation. If the residents of Groest agree to the 
construction of the windfarm, then a compensation per household will be made available. 
Agreeing to the construction of the windfarm is viewed as an investment of the residents 
into the project. That is why every surrounding household, under which your household, 
receives in that case a share in the windfarm. With this share you receive a part of the 
profit of the windfarm. The share generates a sum of 120 euro per household per year for 
the next 15 years. After 15 years your share has generated 1800 euros for you. With your 
share you receive an official certificate which verifies your support for the windfarm.” 
The compensation for the voice co-ownership condition states: “With the arrival of 
energyprojects such as the windfarm in Groest it is common to offer the surrounding 
residents a compensation. If the residents of Groest agree to the construction of the 
windfarm, then a compensation per household will be made available. Agreeing to the 
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construction of the windfarm is viewed as an investment of the residents into the project. 
That is why every surrounding household, under which your household, receives in that 
case a share in the windfarm. With this share you receive a part of the profit of the 
windfarm. The share generates a sum of 120 euro per household per year for the next 15 
years. After 15 years your share has generated 1800 euros for you. This share also gives 
you the right of say in meetings about this project. You are allowed to vote about how, 
where and when the windfarm will be build. With your share you receive an official 
certificate which verifies your support for the windfarm.”  
 After reading the scenario sketch with compensation offer, the participants were 
given a questionnaire containing the dependent variables and controlling variables. With 
the questions they received a reminder of their compensation offer. Participants were then 
asked to provide some demographic information about themselves, including their 
gender, age, highest level of education and place of residence. After finishing the 
questions, the participants received information about the gift vouchers they could win 
and how to apply for them. Gift vouchers of 25 Euros were to be distributed among all 
participants that were willing to fill in their email address. Participants had a chance of 
winning that was approximately one out of ten (based on 200 participants). A maximum 
of 20 gift vouchers in total was distributed. The participants whom won a voucher were 
contacted through e-mail. Finishing the complete study took approximately 20 minutes. 
Afterwards participants received a full debriefing. 
 
Measures 
  Almost all measures used 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree) 
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to 7 (totally agree) as response rate. When a measure had a different response rate then 
this has been indicated below.   
 
Acceptance of compensation. The acceptance of the compensation was measured with 
three items (α = .79). The items were “I find the offered compensation good”, “I find the 
offered compensation desirable” and “I find the offered compensation appropriate”. 
 
Acceptance of project. The acceptance of the project was measured with four items (α = 
.95). Items were the self-developed statements “I find the plan to build a windfarm near 
Groest a great idea”, “I would react positively to the proposed windfarm near Groest”, 
“I would accept the plan to build a windfarm near Groest” and “I would protest against 
the proposed windfarm near Groest”.  
 
Morality. The mediator morality was measured with three statements about the perceived 
morality of the compensation (α = .87). Three traits of the Morality Scale from Abele and 
Wojciszke (2007) were used in the self-constructed items “I find the offered 
compensation respectful”, “I find the offered compensation moral” and “I find the offered 
compensation fair”.   
 
Manipulation check. Two items were used to measure the feeling of co-ownership which 
investigated the difference between the monetary condition and the symbolic co-
ownership condition. The items were “I have the feeling that I participate in this project” 
and “I feel involved in this project”. Two items were used to measure the feeling of right 
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of say which investigated the difference between the symbolic co-ownership condition 
and the voice co-ownership condition. The items were “I have the feeling that I have 
something to say in this project” and “I have the feeling that I can contribute to this 
project”.  
   
Comprehension check. The comprehension check was measured by giving participants a 
reminder of their compensation offer and asking “Is this compensation equal to the 
compensation that has been proposed to you before?” which they could answer with 
“Yes, that is correct” or “No, that is not correct”. In all conditions the correct answer was 
“Yes, that is correct”. 
 
General knowledge check. The general knowledge of participants about windmills was 
measured with two items. The items read “In general I am a supporter of generating 
energy through windmills” and “Before filling in this questionnaire I already knew much 
about windmills”.  
 
Results 
Preliminary screening of the data 
  The complete dataset was downloaded from Qualtrics to SPSS IBM Statistics and 
contained 241 responses. The data was first investigated on a priori criteria. Participants 
were excluded from further analyses if they had not finished the entire questionnaire, as 
was mentioned in the informed consent. This excluded 46 cases. Participants whom failed 
the comprehension check were also excluded from further analyses because they had not 
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understood the scenario sketch correctly. This excluded 22 participants. Next, the 
remaining participants were investigated on the variable time, to see whether they had 
finished the questionnaire in significant less or more time than average. Z-scores were 
created from the variable ‘Duration in Seconds’ and participants with a Z-score above 3 
or below -3 were excluded from further analyses. This excluded four participants which 
all had a Z-score above 3. These participants had respectively taken 3.48 hours, 3.27 
hours, 3.18 hours or 2.92 hours about the questionnaire. After excluding these outliers the 
final sample consisted of 169 participants. Table 1 provides further information about 
how many participants were excluded per condition. The analyses reported below were 
performed on a dataset of 169 participants.  
Table 1 
Overview of participant exclusion per condition 
Total participants Monetary 80 
Excluded participants Monetary 19 
Percentage Monetary completed 76% 
  
Total Participants Symbolic 79 
Excluded participants Symbolic 22 
Percentage Symbolic completed 72% 
  
Total participants Voice 81 
Excluded participants Voice 30 
Percentage Voice completed 63% 
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Checks 
  The items of the manipulation check were investigated in order to see whether the 
manipulation in the scenario sketches had the intended effect on feeling of participation 
in the project and feeling of influence in the project. The first two items checked the 
feeling of participation in the project, which would be expected to be higher in the 
symbolic co-ownership condition than in the monetary condition. A one-way ANOVA 
showed no significant difference between the conditions, F(2,166) = 1.46, p = .235, ηp
2
 = 
.02, for the item “I have the feeling that I participate in this project”. Also for the item “I 
feel involved in this project” was no significant difference between the conditions, 
F(2,166) = .08, p = .920, ηp
2
 = .001. This indicated that the manipulation for feeling 
participation in the project had not worked as was anticipated.  
  The last two items checked the feeling of influence in the project, which would be 
expected to be higher in the voice co-ownership condition than in the symbolic co-
ownership condition. A one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference between the 
conditions for the items “I have the feeling that I have something to say in this project”, 
F(2,166) = .82, p = .441, ηp
2
 = .01, and “I have the feeling that I can contribute to this 
project”, F(2,166) = .59, p = .555, ηp
2
 = .01.This indicated that the manipulation for 
feeling influence in the project had not worked as was anticipated.  
  Assumptions of the ANOVA were checked. The assumption of independent 
observations is a design matter. In the study each IP address was allowed to participate 
only once so that a person could not easily participate more than once. The assumption of 
normality was checked by looking at the cell n. Each cell n was above fifteen, so F was 
robust. The assumption of homogeneity of variances was checked using Levene’s test. 
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The variable ‘Scale of compensation’ showed a non-significant result, F(2, 166) = 0.01, p 
= .989, which indicated that there was no violation of the assumption of homogeneity of 
variances. The variable ‘Scale of project’ also showed a non-significant result, F(2, 166) 
= 0.64, p = .531, which indicated that there was no violation of the assumption of 
homogeneity here either.  
 
Test of hypotheses  
  The first and second hypothesis were tested by conducting two Univariate 
ANOVA’s. The first hypothesis read “Both symbolic co-ownership and voice co-
ownership as compensation lead to higher acceptance of the compensation and the 
project than monetary compensation”. The second hypothesis read “Voice co-ownership 
leads to higher acceptance of the compensation and the project than symbolic co-
ownership”.  
  A univariate ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the variable 
‘Condition’, which contained the information whether participants were enrolled in the 
monetary, symbolic or voice compensation condition, on the variable ‘Scale of project’, 
which was not significant, F(2, 166) = 0.51, p = .601, ηp
2
 = .01.This result shows that 
there is no significant difference between the conditions on the acceptance of the project. 
Table 2 provides further information on the means of the different groups.  
  Another univariate ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the variable 
‘Condition’ on the variable ‘Scale of compensation’. There was no significant result, F(2, 
166) = 0.43, p = .655, ηp
2
 = .01. This result shows that there is no significant difference 
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between the conditions on the acceptance of the compensation. Table 2 provides further 
information on the means an standard deviations of the different groups.  
Table 2 
Means per condition on scale of project and scale of compensation 
 Scale of project Scale of compensation 
Condition M SD M SD 
Monetary 4.57 .23 4.02 .19 
Symbolic co-ownership 4.70 .24 4.26 .20 
Voice co-ownership 4.35 .25 4.18 .21 
 
  These results showed that the first hypothesis “Both symbolic co-ownership and 
voice co-ownership as compensation lead to higher acceptance of the compensation and 
the project than monetary compensation” was rejected. There was no significant 
difference per condition for either acceptance of the project or acceptance of the 
compensation. For acceptance of the project the mean of symbolic co-ownership was the 
highest (slightly more positive), but no significance was found. The means for acceptance 
of the compensation were all close to neutrality (4). Since the main effect was not 
significant, the second hypothesis “Voice co-ownership leads to higher acceptance of the 
compensation and the project than symbolic co-ownership” was rejected as well. Neither 
acceptance of the project nor acceptance of the compensation showed any significant 
difference for symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership. The mean of symbolic co-
ownership was slightly higher for both acceptance of the project and acceptance of the 
compensation, but no significance was found.  
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Mediation analysis 
  The third hypothesis “The effect of the type of compensation as predicted in 
hypothesis one is mediated by the perceived morality of the compensation” has been 
tested with a mediation analysis using Process (Hayes & Preacher, 2014). Bootstrapping 
procedure was set on 10000 and model number four was chosen. The Helmert procedure 
was used since the dependent variable is multicategorical and the mediator only predicts 
a difference between monetary compensation and co-ownership.  
  First, the relationship between ‘Condition’, ‘Morality’ and ‘Acceptance of the 
projects’ was investigated. The relative total effect ‘Condition’ to ‘Acceptance of project’ 
was not significant, F(2, 166) = 0.51, p = .600, R
2
 = 0.01 with b = -0.05, t(166) = -0.16, p 
= .873 for dummy one. Dummy one was the difference between the monetary condition 
and the co-ownership conditions. The relative indirect effect ‘Condition’ to ‘Acceptance 
of project’ via ‘Morality scale’ was significant, F(3, 165) = 20.68, p = < .001, R2 = .27. 
With ‘Morality scale’ to ‘Acceptance of project’ as b = .61, t(165) = 7.79, p = < .001 with 
b = -.11, t(165) = -0.44, p = .660 for dummy one. ‘Condition’ to ‘Morality scale’ was not 
significant, F(2, 166) = 0.13, p = .875, R
2
 = 0.002 with b = .10, t(166) = 0.42, p = .676 for 
dummy one. Figure 1 gives an overview of the mediation model. Since the relative 
indirect effect was significant it can be concluded that perceived morality did have a 
relationship with acceptance of the project, but mediation was not present.  
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Figure 1. Mediation model of condition to morality to acceptance of project. 
  Second, the relationship between ‘Condition’, ‘Morality’ and ‘Acceptance of the 
compensation’ was investigated. The relative total effect ‘Condition’ to ‘Acceptance of 
the compensation’ was not significant, F(2, 166) = 0.425, p = .655, R2 = 0.01 with b = 
.21, t(166) = 0.87, p = .387 for dummy one. Dummy one was the difference between the 
monetary condition and the co-ownership conditions. The relative indirect effect 
‘Condition’ to ‘Acceptance of compensation’ via ‘Morality scale’ was significant, F(3, 
16t) = 108.19, p = < .001, R
2
 = .66. With ‘Morality scale’ to ‘Acceptance of 
compensation’ as b = .79, t(165) = 17.95, p = < .001 with b = .13, t(165) = 0.90, p = .368 
for dummy one. ‘Condition’ to ‘Morality scale’ was not significant, F(2, 166) = 0.13, p = 
.875, R
2
 = 0.002 with b = .10, t(166) = 0.42, p = .676 for dummy one. Figure 2 gives an 
illustration of the mediation model. Since the indirect effect was significant it can be 
concluded that morality did have a relationship with acceptance of the compensation, but 
mediation was not present.    
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Figure 2. Mediation model of Condition to Morality to Acceptance of compensation. 
 
  The results above did not support the third hypothesis: “The effect of the type of 
compensation as predicted in the first hypothesis is mediated by the perceived morality of 
the compensation”. Therefore, it was rejected.  
 
General Discussion 
  In this study we investigated different forms of compensation on their influence 
on acceptance of the project (i.e. windfarm siting) and acceptance of the compensation. 
These forms of compensation were respectively: monetary compensation, symbolic co-
ownership compensation and voice co-ownership compensation. The results showed that 
there was no difference between the monetary compensation and co-ownership 
compensations on acceptance of the project nor on acceptance of the compensation. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis which stated that both forms of co-ownership would lead 
to increased acceptance of the project and of the compensation was not supported. Also, 
no difference was found between symbolic co-ownership and voice co-ownership on 
acceptance of the project nor on acceptance of the compensation. Therefore, the second 
hypothesis which stated that voice co-ownership would lead to increased acceptance 
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compared to symbolic co-ownership was not supported. It was found that perceived 
morality did have a positive relationship with acceptance of the project and acceptance of 
the compensation, but no mediation was found. The third hypothesis predicted a 
mediating role of perceived morality on the type of compensation and the acceptance of 
the project or acceptance of the compensation and was therefore rejected.   
  One possible explanation for the non-significant results in the current study might 
be the failing of the manipulations. Both the feeling of co-ownership and the feeling of a 
right of say were not significantly different between the three conditions. This means that 
the manipulations may have been too subtle to create an actual difference in feeling co-
ownership and feeling a right of say.  
  When taking a closer look at the results it is found that somewhat more 
participants failed the comprehension check in the symbolic co-ownership condition and 
the voice co-ownership condition than in the monetary condition. This might indicate that 
the scenarios in these conditions were relatively complicated. It was also found that more 
participants in the co-ownership conditions than in the monetary condition did not 
complete the entire questionnaire, which again might indicate that the scenarios for the 
co-ownership conditions were relatively difficult. The additional information about a 
right of say and certificate in the scenarios of the co-ownership conditions might have 
caused the relative difficulty. The scenario of the monetary condition was shorter and 
relatively less complex. Future research might take it into account that all scenarios 
should have the same length and same complexity as much as possible.  
  One more issue worth mentioning is that the sample in this study mostly consisted 
of highly educated participants from big cities. This makes the sample a bit homogeneous 
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even though the sample did not consist solely out of students. A more diverse sample 
might give different results than the ones that were found in this study. Future research 
should try to recruit a more diverse sample. For example with people from more rural 
areas since they might have a different response pattern (Slee, 2015).  
  A suggestion for future research on this topic would be to investigate how to 
communicate (i.e. frame) the feeling of co-ownership and the feeling of a right of say in 
order to make the manipulations more successful. The way the feeling of co-ownership 
and the feeling of a right of say have been manipulated in the current research might have 
been too subtle to measure an effect. It is recommended to investigate in what way the 
manipulations should be framed to make them stronger. Walker, Russel, and Kurz (2017) 
already showed that framing community benefits in a way that makes it seem like the 
offered compensation is a governmental necessity increased the acceptance of the 
compensation. Since the current study showed no increased acceptance when participants 
were given a right of say, it is recommended to focus future research on framing a feeling 
of co-ownership rather than on giving people a right of say.  
  Another suggestion is to investigate co-ownership compensation in real life 
settings and not just by using scenarios. A scenario was used in the current study and this 
allowed for easy comparability of different compensation measures. A certificate was 
offered in the scenario as reward in order to create a feeling of participation. However, 
the results might be different if the study is repeated in a real life setting. Case studies 
about co-ownership in Scotland have shown positive results on acceptance of the project 
when the local people got involved in the windfarm project (Warren & McFadyen, 2010). 
People seem more engaged with the windfarm in general when they are allowed to 
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participate in the project and this engagement might even create a more positive attitude 
towards renewable energy in general on the long run. It is therefore recommended to 
investigate the effect of the different compensations in real placements of windfarms to 
see whether results are different from a scenario study.   
  It is also recommended to investigate people with a moderate opinion on 
windfarms. They neither have a very positive nor very negative opinion and this might 
make them more susceptible to framing. In the current study it was found that in general 
people have a very positive opinion about generating energy by means of wind mills. 
However, this result might have been influenced by the questionnaire itself since the 
question about people’s general opinion has been asked almost at the end of the 
questionnaire. It could be that people with very strong opinions are not easily persuaded 
to change their opinion to a more positive one by a compensation. It is advised to 
investigate people with a moderate opinion about windfarms, since they might in general 
be more susceptible towards changing their opinion (Lecheler, De Vreese, & Slothuus, 
2009). These people might be where the most ‘profit’ is to be gained.  
  One practical implication of this study is that companies might not necessarily 
have to give people a right of say, since the results in this study suggest that this did not 
increase acceptance between the two co-ownership conditions. Giving people a right of 
say complicates decisional processes and therefore might rather be avoided by 
companies. However, it is important to consider the social responsibility of companies. 
People should be treated fairly. When people feel that they are treated fairly, for example 
by being given a voice in the matter, they will comply easier to a request (Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003). So, even though this study suggests that giving people a right of say does 
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not seem to increase acceptance, it is still important to take into account the interest of the 
community’s people.   
  Another practical implication is the finding that companies which place 
windfarms should take into account the perceived morality of the compensation they 
offer (if they offer one). People seem to find it important that the proposed compensation 
is moral and this influences their acceptance of the compensation and project. This 
knowledge might help companies to offer more effective compensations and be more 
successful in placing a windfarm. It is recommended that companies pre-test their chosen 
compensation on perceived morality. The questions that measured perceived morality in 
this study could be a good tool to do so (see Appendix A).  
  The finding that the perceived morality of the compensation has a positive 
relationship with acceptance is also a theoretical implication. This effect has previously 
not been known in the scientific literature. It has been shown that money is rejected when 
it is perceived as an immoral compensation (Stellar & Willer, 2014). However, that the 
perceived morality of the proposed compensation can also have a positive relationship 
with acceptance has not been known before.  
  To summarize, no difference was found on acceptance of the project and 
acceptance of the compensation between monetary compensation, symbolic co-
ownership compensation or voice co-ownership compensation. Perceived morality of the 
compensation offer was found to have a positive relationship with acceptance of the 
project and acceptance of the compensation. Companies whom wish to increase 
acceptance of windfarms will have to take into account that their compensation offer 
should be perceived as moral.     
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Appendix A. Full questionnaire 
 
“The following statements are about the compensation which is offered to the 
surrounding household of the windfarm, under which your household. Below there is 
once more a short description of the compensation which is offered to you.”  
 
The monetary condition continued with the description: “If the residents of Groest agree 
with the construction of the windfarm then your household receives a sum of 120 euro 
per year for the next 15 years. After 15 years you will have received 1800 euro.”  
 
The symbolic co-ownership condition continued with the description: “If the residents of 
Groest agree with the construction of the windfarm then your household receives a share 
in the windfarm. The share generates a sum of 120 euro per household per year for the 
next 15 years. After 15 years your share has generated 1800 euros for you. With your 
share you receive an official certificate which verifies your support for the windfarm.”  
 
The voice co-ownership condition continued with the description: “If the residents of 
Groest agree with the construction of the windfarm then your household receives a share 
in the windfarm. The share generates a sum of 120 euro per household per year for the 
next 15 years. After 15 years your share has generated 1800 euros for you. This share 
also gives you the right of say in meetings about this project. You are allowed to vote 
about how, where and when the windfarm will be build. With your share you receive an 
official certificate which verifies your support for the windfarm.”  
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Questions about the acceptance of the compensation: ‘I find the offered compensation 
good’, ‘I find the offered compensation desirable’ and ‘I find the offered compensation 
appropriate’.  
 
Questions about the perceived morality of the compensation: “I find the offered 
compensation respectful”, “I find the offered compensation moral” and “I find the offered 
compensation fair”.  
 
“The statements bellow are about how you view the windfarm project near Groest as a 
resident of Groest. Please indicate to what extend you disagree or agree with each of the 
following statements.” 
 
Questions about the acceptance of the project: “I find the plan to build a windfarm near 
Groest a great idea”, “I would react positively to the proposed windfarm near Groest”, 
“I would accept the plan to build a windfarm near Groest”,  “I would protest against the 
proposed windfarm near Groest”.  
   
“The coming four statements are addressing how you feel about the proposed windfarm 
project near Groest as a resident of Groest. Please indicate to what extend you disagree 
or agree with each of the following statements.” 
 
Manipulation checks: “I have the feeling that I participate in this project”, “I feel 
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involved in this project”, “I have the feeling that I have something to say in this project”, 
“I have the feeling that I can contribute to this project”. 
 
“The following statements are about your opinion of windmills in general. Please 
indicate to what extend you disagree or agree with each of the following statements.” 
 
Questions about general knowledge of participant: “In general I am a supporter of 
generating energy through windmills”, “Before filling in this questionnaire I already 
knew much about windmills”. 
  
“In the situation sketch that you read before, it was mentioned what compensation the 
residents of Groest would be offered. To see if the situation sketch was clear we would 
like to see how much you can remember of the to you offered compensation. Below there 
is a compensation offer. Please indicate whether this is the compensation which has been 
proposed to you before.” 
 
Participants in the monetary condition read: “If the residents of Groest agree with the 
construction of the windfarm then your household receives a sum of 120 euro per year 
for the next 15 years. After 15 years you will have received 1800 euro.” 
Participants in the symbolic co-ownership condition read: “If the residents of Groest 
agree with the construction of the windfarm then your household receives a share in the 
windfarm. The share generates a sum of 120 euro per household per year for the next 15 
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years. After 15 years your share has generated 1800 euros for you. With your share you 
receive an official certificate which verifies your support for the windfarm.” 
 
The participants in the voice co-ownership condition read: “If the residents of Groest 
agree with the construction of the windfarm then your household receives a share in the 
windfarm. The share generates a sum of 120 euro per household per year for the next 15 
years. After 15 years your share has generated 1800 euros for you. This share also gives 
you the right of say in meetings about this project. You are allowed to vote about how, 
where and when the windfarm will be build. With your share you receive an official 
certificate which verifies your support for the windfarm.” 
 
“ Is this compensation equal to the compensation that has been proposed to you before?” 
Answer: “Yes, that is correct” or “No, that is not correct”. 
 
 
